AI and the Project Controls Architecture
May 12, 2026
Do We Need a Project Controls Body of Knowledge (PCBOK)?
June 4, 2026
Few projects in modern UK history have generated as much debate as High Speed 2 (HS2).
Originally positioned as a transformational national infrastructure programme, HS2 has since become a case study in:
- Cost escalation
- Scope reduction
- Delays
- Governance and delivery challenges
What makes this particularly significant is that:
The project’s scope reduced substantially — while projected costs increased dramatically.
Initial estimates in the early stages were around £32–37bn, yet more recent projections suggest costs could exceed £100bn, while major northern sections to Manchester and Leeds were cancelled. (Reuters)
So what actually went wrong?
1. The Project Started Before Sufficient Design Maturity
One of the recurring themes across public reviews is that the programme was pushed into delivery before the scope and design were sufficiently mature.
The Stewart Review and subsequent commentary highlighted:
- Political pressure to “start”
- Unrealistic timelines
- Incomplete design development
- Immature scope definition
Even HS2 leadership later acknowledged a “rush to start” before adequate planning and cost certainty existed. (The Guardian)
This is a classic megaproject issue:
The desire to demonstrate momentum overtook delivery readiness.
2. Optimism Bias & Underestimation
HS2 also appears to demonstrate the long-recognised issue of:
- Optimism bias
- Strategic underestimation
- Benefit overstatement
Multiple public reviews noted that:
- Costs were underestimated
- Risks insufficiently quantified
- Contingencies progressively eroded
- Complexity underestimated
The NAO had already raised concerns years earlier around increasing compensation costs, station costs, and declining contingency resilience. (National Audit Office (NAO))
This reflects a wider challenge seen globally across megaprojects:
Projects are often approved based on affordability assumptions rather than delivery reality.
3. Scope Changes & Policy Shifts
Another major issue was continuous change:
- Cancellation of northern legs
- Euston redesigns
- Funding model changes
- Speed reductions
- Scope reconfigurations
The programme experienced repeated political and policy shifts across administrations. (GOV.UK)
This created:
- Rework
- Contractual inefficiencies
- Delayed decisions
- Loss of delivery momentum
- Escalating uncertainty
One of the harsh realities in major programmes is:
Constant strategic change destroys delivery stability.
4. Weak Integration Across Cost, Schedule, Risk & Change
Public reports repeatedly pointed to:
- Fragmented controls
- Weak cost management
- Poor contract incentives
- Lack of integrated oversight
The Stewart Review highlighted that:
- Contracts incentivised schedule progression over cost control
- Performance management broke down
- Reliable outcomes were not consistently achieved (GOV.UK)
This is fundamentally a Project Controls issue.
When:
- Cost
- Schedule
- Risk
- Change
- Scope
are not fully integrated, organisations lose the ability to:
- Forecast reliably
- Detect divergence early
- Make timely interventions
5. Stakeholder Complexity & Buy-In
HS2 was never just an engineering project.
It involved:
- Central government
- Local authorities
- Communities
- Environmental groups
- Regulators
- Supply chains
- Investors
- Rail operators
Stakeholder management became extraordinarily complex, particularly around:
- Environmental compliance
- Land acquisition
- Community disruption
- Euston redevelopment
- Regional political expectations
In megaprojects, stakeholder alignment is not a “soft issue”:
It is a delivery-critical discipline.
6. Governance vs Delivery Reality
One of the strongest observations from parliamentary and public reviews is the gap between:
- Governance structures and
- Delivery reality
The Public Accounts Committee described failures in:
- Oversight
- Financial control
- Accountability
- Delivery capability (Parliament Publications)
This highlights an uncomfortable truth:
Governance does not guarantee control.
Complex projects require:
- Timely decisions
- Realistic baselines
- Integrated controls
- Strong leadership
- Delivery accountability
Key Lessons Learned (LLs)
Do Not Start Before Design Maturity
Political urgency should never override delivery readiness.
Stress-Test Assumptions Aggressively
A credible estimate is not the same as an affordable estimate.
Integrate Cost, Schedule, Risk & Change
Fragmented controls create fragmented decisions.
Stability Matters
Constant policy and scope shifts destroy delivery efficiency.
Stakeholder Engagement Must Be Continuous
Buy-in is not achieved once — it must be maintained throughout the lifecycle.
Major Projects Need Stronger Assurance
Particularly where public money is involved.
Bodies such as National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA/IPA) are making efforts to strengthen governance and assurance frameworks in the UK, but HS2 demonstrates that:
Megaproject oversight still requires stronger integration between governance, controls, and delivery execution.
Final Reflection
HS2 should not simply be viewed as a “failed railway project.”
It should be viewed as:
One of the most important project delivery case studies of modern times.
Because the core issues are not unique to rail.
They are the same themes repeatedly seen across global megaprojects:
- Optimism bias
- Weak integration
- Scope instability
- Political interference
- Poorly aligned incentives
- Delayed decision-making
- Weak delivery realism
The challenge now is not simply to criticise HS2.
The challenge is:
How do we ensure future megaprojects do not repeat the same mistakes?
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are purely my personal and professional reflections based on information available in the public domain, including credible media reports, parliamentary publications, and industry commentary. The intent of this article is not to criticise, blame, or offend any individual, organisation, or institution involved in HS2, but rather to encourage constructive discussion around project delivery, governance, lessons learned, and how we can collectively improve the successful delivery of future major programmes.
Sources
https://www.reuters.com/business/cost-uks-hs2-rail-project-soars-138-billion-minister-says-2026-05-19
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/may/19/hs2-bill-could-rise-102bn-pounds-first-trains-delayed-until-2039-government-admits?
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/hs2-costs?
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/dec/19/hs2-mark-wild-costs-budget-department-transport?
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68a72b319e1cebdd2c96a0ae/hs2-experience-major-transport-projects-governance-assurance-review.pdf?
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Progress-with-preparations-for-High-Speed-2.pdf?
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hs2-6-monthly-report-to-parliament-july-2025?
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hs2-6-monthly-report-to-parliament-july-2025?
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/jun/18/hs2-delayed-beyond-2033-high-speed-rail?
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmpubacc/357/report.html?
https://www.ft.com/content/591a5746-f4ac-43f5-b94b-5fc287525cc7?
https://www.productivity.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PIP052-What-went-wrong-with-HS2-February-2025.pdf?
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/hs2-update-following-cancellation-of-phase-2.pdf?
https://www.productivity.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PIP052-What-went-wrong-with-HS2-February-2025.pdf?
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/hs2-costs?
